Basic Research, LLC, Dynakor Pharmacal, LLC, The Carter-Reed Company, LLC, Zoller Laboratories, LLC, Dennis Gay, Daniel B. Mowrey and Mitchell K. Friedlander v. Admiral Insurance Co : Reply Brief by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2011
Basic Research, LLC, Dynakor Pharmacal, LLC,
The Carter-Reed Company, LLC, Zoller
Laboratories, LLC, Dennis Gay, Daniel B. Mowrey
and Mitchell K. Friedlander v. Admiral Insurance
Co : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Alan C Bradshaw, Aaron C Garrett; Manning, Curtis, Bradshaw & Bednar; David A Gauntlett, James
A Lowe, Andrew M Sussman; Gauntlett & Associates; Attorneys for Appellants.
Phillip S Ferguson; Christensen & Jensen; David J Garthe; Boornazian, Jensen & Garthe; Attorneys
for Appellee.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Basic Research v. Admiral Insurance Co, No. 20110556 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2011).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/2923
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
BASIC RESEARCH, LLC, DYNAKOR 
PHARMACAL, LLC, THE CARTER-REED 
COMPANY, LLC, ZOLLER 
LABORATORIES, LLC, DENNIS GAY, 
DANIEL B. MOWREY and MITCHELL K. 
FRIEDLANDER, 
Plaintiffs/Appellants, 
v. 
ADMIRAL INSURANCE COMPANY, a 
Delaware corporation, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
' 
CaseNo.20110556-SC 
Third District No. 110901154 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
On Appeal from the Final Judgment of the Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake 
County, Honorable L.A. Dever, District Judge 
Phillip S. Ferguson 
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C. 
15 West South Temple, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1572 
David J. Garthe 
BOORNAZIAN JENSEN & GARTHE 
555 12th Street, Suite 1800 
Oakland, CA 94607-4046 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee 
Alan C. Bradshaw 
Aaron C. Garrett 
MANNING CURTIS BRADSHAW & BEDNAR LLC 
10 Exchange Place, 3rd Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
David A. Gauntlett 
James A. Lowe 
Andrew M. Sussman 
GAUNTLETT & ASSOCIATES 
18400 Von Karman, Suite 300 
Irvine, California 92612 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
I IT F ' L E D 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
FEB - 7 2012 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
BASIC RESEARCH, LLC, DYNAKOR 
PHARMACAL, LLC, THE CARTER-REED 
COMPANY, LLC, ZOLLER 
LABORATORIES, LLC, DENNIS GAY, 
DANIEL B. MOWREY and MITCHELL K. 
FRIEDLANDER, 
Plaintiffs/ Appellants, 
v. 
ADMIRAL INSURANCE COMPANY, a 
Delaware corporation, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
CaseNo.20110556-SC 
Third District No. 110901154 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
On Appeal from the Final Judgment of the Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake 
County, Honorable L.A. Dever, District Judge 
Phillip S. Ferguson 
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C. 
15 West South Temple, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1572 
David J. Garthe 
BOORNAZIAN JENSEN & GARTHE 
555 12th Street, Suite 1800 
Oakland, CA 94607-4046 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee 
Alan C. Bradshaw 
Aaron C. Garrett 
MANNING CURTIS BRADSHAW & BEDNAR LLC 
10 Exchange Place, 3rd Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
David A. Gauntlett 
James A. Lowe 
Andrew M. Sussman 
GAUNTLETT & ASSOCIATES 
18400 Von Karman, Suite 300 
Irvine, California 92612 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF CONTENTS i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iii 
I. ADMIRAL DISREGARDS PLED FACTS POTENTIALLY 
REQUIRING DEFENSE DUTY 1 
A. Claimants' Allegations of Akavar Purchases, Not its Use, and 
Resulting Damages Trigger Coverage 1 
B. Claimants Allege Class "Damages" Resulting Only from Akavar 
Purchases, Not from its Use 3 
C. The Trial Court, Misled by Admiral, Erroneously Presumed All 
Claimants used Akavar Products 5 
II. ADMIRAL MISCHARACTERIZES THE LEGAL DOCTRINES 
ESTABLISHING POTENTIAL COVERAGE UNDER ITS POLICY 5 
A. Admiral Asserts a "Causation" Requirement Based on the 
Policy Term "Arising Out Of," Which Does Not Require 
"Proximate Causation" 5 
B. "Damages" Is a Remedy "Because of 'Advertising Injury5" 7 
1. The Theory of Recovery Does Not Require Proximate 
Cause Analysis 7 
2. The Damages Remedy Is Not Altered By Measurement as 
Money Paid, Nor is the Damage Amount So Limited 7 
C. Noscitur a Sociis Does Not Limit the Meaning of "Use of 
Another's" ..8 
D. The Policy Term "Of Imposes No Claimant Ownership Limit 
on the "Advertising Idea" 10 
E. Basic Research's Alleged "Use" of Western Holdings' 
"Advertising Ideas" Triggers a Policy "Offense" 12 
III. ADMIRAL'S COVERAGE CASES ARE READILY 
DISTINGUISHABLE 13 
A. Admiral Cites No Coverage Case Analyzing False Advertising 
Claims under Offense (f) 13 
B. An Offense (f) "Advertising Idea" is Not Limited to a Claimant's 
"Advertising Idea" 14 
i 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
C. "Advertising Ideas" are not Limited to Misappropriation 18 
D. Admiral's Other Cases Are Readily Distinguishable 19 
IV. EXCLUSION (G) DOES NOT BAR A DEFENSE 22 
V. CONCLUSION .26 
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE 28 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 29 
ii 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Page(s) 
FEDERAL CASES 
Aearo Corp. v. American Int'l Specialty Lines Ins. Co., 
676 F. Supp. 2d 738 (S.D. Ind. 2009)... 16 
Align Tech., Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 
673 F. Supp. 2d 957 (N.D. Cal. 2009) 5 
AMCOIns. Co. v. Inspired Technologies, Inc., 
648 F.3d 875 (8th Cir. (Minn.) 2011) 23, 24 
Amcolns. Co. v. Lauren-Spencer, Inc., 
500 F. Supp. 2d 721 (S.D. Ohio 2007) 10-11 
American Simmental Ass 'n v. Coregis Ins. Co., 
282 F.3d 582 (8th Cir. (Neb.) 2002) 14-15,20,22 
Applied Bolting Tech. Products v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 
942 F. Supp. 1029 (E.D. Pa. 1996) 9,10 
Butler v. Clarendon Am. Ins. Co., 
494 F. Supp. 2d 1112 (N.D. Cal. 2007) ..7 
Creative Hospitality Ventures, Inc. v. United States Liab. Ins. Co., 
655 F. Supp. 2d 1316 (S.D. Fla. 2009) 16,20 
Curtis-Universal, Inc. v. Sheboygan Emerg. Med. Servs., Inc., 
43 F.3d 1119 (7th Cir. (Wis.) 1994) 18 
Cypress Plateau Min. Corp. v. Commonwealth Ins. Co., 
972 F. Supp. 1379 (D. Utah 1997) 24 
Delarosa v. Boiron, Inc., 
275 F.R.D. 582 (CD. Cal. 2011) 8 
DISH Network Corp. v. Arch Specialty Ins. Co., 
659 F.3d 1010 (10th Cir. (Colo.) 2011).... 19,20 
Elcom Technologies, Inc. v. Hartford Ins. Co. of the Midwest, 
991 F. Supp. 1294 (D. Utah 1997) 10,26 
Hudson Ins. Co. v. Colony Ins. Co., 
624 F.3d 1264 (9th Cir. (Cal.) 2010) 13 
Hymanv. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 
304 F.3d 1179 (11th Cir. (Fla.) 2002) 15,21 
iii 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Hyundai Motor Am. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA, 
600 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. (Cal.) 2010) '. 15 
Infor Global Solutions (Michigan), Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 
686 F. Supp. 2d 1005 (N.D. Cal. 2010) 25 
J.A. Brundage Plumbing & Roto-Rooter, Inc. v. Massachusetts Bay Ins. Co., 818 F. Supp. 
553 (W.D.N. Y. 1993), vacated by reason of settlement, 153 F.R.D. 36 (W.D.N. Y. 
1994) 21 
Native American Arts, Inc. v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 
435 F.3d 729 (7th Cir. (111.) 2006) 15 
New Hampshire Ins. Co. v. Power-O-Peat, Inc., 
907 F.2d 58 (8th Cir. (Minn.) 1990) 25 
Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Cloud Nine, LLC, 
464 F. Supp. 2d 1161 (D. Utah 2006) 1, 3, 5, 10, 12, 14, 19, 10,21,22 
Rose Acre Farms, Inc. v. Columbia Cas. Co., 
662 F.3d 765,2011 WL 5313818 (7th Cir. (Ind.) 2011) 13, 14, 16, 17, 18, 19 
Rose Acre Farms, Inc. v. Columbia Cas. Co., 
772 F. Supp. 2d 994 (S.D. Ind. 2011) 16 
Skylink Technologies, Inc. v. Assurance Co., 
400 F.3d 982 (7th Cir. (111.) 2005) 25 
Superperformance Int'l, Inc. v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 
203 F. Supp. 2d 587 (E.D. Va. 2002) 26 
Trailer Bridge, Inc. v. Illinois National Ins. Co., 
657F.3d 1135 (11th Cir. (Fla.) 2011) 13, 14, 15, 16 
Welch Foods v. National Union Fire Co. of Pittsburgh, 
659 F.3d 191 (1st Cir. (Mass.) 2011) ..'. 21, 22 
STATE CASES 
Accessories Biz, Inc. v. Linda and Jay Keane, Inc., 
533 F. Supp. 2d 381 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) 21,22 
Alfv. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 
850 P.2d 1272 (Utah 1993) 16, 18 
Bank of the West v. Sup. Ct, 
2 Cal.4th 1254 (1992) 7 
Benjamin v. Arnica Mut. Ins. Co., 140P.3d 1210, 1216 (Utah 2006) 1, 2, 3, 5 
iv 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
General Cas Co. of Wis. v. Wozniak Travel, Inc., 
762 N.W.2d 572 (Minn. 2009) 12, 14 
Heathman v. Giles, 
374 P.2d 839 (Utah 1962) 9 
LDSHosp., aDiv. of Intermountain Health Care, Inc. v. Capitol Life Ins. Co., 
765 P.2d 857 (Utah 1988) 22 
McCormack Baron Mgmt. Servs., Inc. v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 
989 S.W.2d 168 (Mo. 1999) 11 
Nat'I Farmers Union Prop. & Cas. Co. v. Western Cas. & Sur. Co., 577 P.2d 961 (Utah 
1978) 6 
Rasmussen v. Western Cas. & Sur. Co., 
393 P.2d 333 (Utah 1964) 24 
Sharon Steel Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 
931 P.2d 127 (Utah 1997) 3 
Simmons v. Farmers Ins. Group, 
877 P.2d 1255 (Utah App. 1994) 3,14 
Sorbee Int 7 Ltd. v. Chubb Custom Ins. Co., 
735 A.2d 712 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999) 19,21 
Taylor v. Am. Fire & Cas. Co., 
925 P.2d 1279 (UtahCt. App. 1996) 17 
Total Call Int'I., Inc. v. Peerless Ins. Co., 
181 Cal. App. 4th 161 (Cal. App. 2010) 24,25 
U.S. Fid. & Guar. Assoc, v. Sandt, 
854 P.2d 519 (Utah 1993) 22 
U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. United States Sports Spec. Assn., 
2012 UT 3, _ _ P.2d , 2012 WL 192793 15 
DOCKETED CASES 
Clarcor, Inc. v. Columbia Cas. Co., 
No. 3:10-00336, 2010 WL 5211607 (M.D. Tenn. Dec. 16, 2010) 19, 20, 21, 22, 23 
Durbanov. American Empire Ins., 
No. 91-4225,91-4142, 1992 WL 112246 (10th Cir. (Utah) 1992) 6 
Jewelers Mut. Ins. v. Milne Jewelry Co., 
No. 2:06-CV-243 TS, 2006 WL 3716112 (D. Utah Dec. 14,2006) 26 
v 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Miller v. Basic Research, LLC, 
No. 2:07-CV-871 TS, 2011 WL 818150 (D. Utah March 2,2010) 2 
Misner v. Potter, 2:07-CV-330 TS, 2008 WL 410128, at *3 (D. Utah Feb. 12, 2008) 18 
Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Albers Med., Inc., 
No. 03-1037-CV-W-ODS, 2005 WL 2319820 (W.D. Mo. Sept. 22, 2005)... 13, 15, 19 
Riesev. QVC, Inc., 
No. CIV. A. 97-40068, 1999 WL 178545 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 30, 1999) 20,22 
Tom Kelley Studios, Inc. v. State Farm Gen. Ins. Co., 
No. 10-55931,2011 WL 6396441 (9th Cir. Dec. 21, 2011) 11, 12 
Westfield Ins. Co. v. Robinson Outdoors, Inc., 
No. 10-151 (JRT/JJG),2011 WL 5593171 (D. Minn. Nov. 17,2011) 12,23 
STATE RULES AND STATUTES 
Cal. Bus. & Profs. Code § 17200 4 
Cal. Civ. Code § 1750 4 
Cal. Civ. Code § 1780(a) 8 
Cal. Civ. Code § 1780(a)(1) 8 
Cal. Civ. Code § 1780(b) 8 
Utah's Consumer Sales Practices Act, Utah Code Ann. § 13-11-1 etseq 3 
Utah's Consumer Sales Practices Act, Utah Code Ann. § 13-1 la-3 10 
OTHER AUTHORITIES 
RANDOM HOUSE UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 1343 (2ded. 1993) 12 
vi 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
I. ADMIRAL DISREGARDS PLED FACTS POTENTIALLY REQUIRING 
DEFENSE DUTY 
A. Claimants' Allegations of Akavar Purchases, Not its Use, and 
Resulting Damages Trigger Coverage 
Admiral's defense duty is determined by considering not just the limited fact 
allegations that Admiral likes but all facts pled. "If one claim or allegation triggers the 
duty to defend, the insurer must defend all claims (that is, covered and non-covered 
claims)... When in doubt, defend." (emphasis added) Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Cloud 
Nine, LLC, 464 F. Supp. 2d 1161, 1166 (D. Utah 2006), citing Benjamin v. Amica Mut. 
Ins. Co., 140 P.3d 1210, 1216 (Utah 2006). 
Admiral spotlights some carefully-culled underlying allegations that the 
representative plaintiffs used Akavar but did not lose weight. Admiral then asserts 
plaintiffs seek remedies based solely on their use of Akavar and failure to lose weight, 
not their purchases prompted by Basic Research's advertisements. [Appellee's Brief 
("AB"), pp. 8-10] But other allegations in Miller, Tompkins and Forlenza assert that the 
representative plaintiffs and class members purchased Akavar in reliance on the 
statements ("Eat All You Want and Still Lose Weight") in Basic Research's 
advertisements and plaintiffs seek damages resulting from the purchases - not from 
product use. [Opening Brief ("OB"), pp. 8-10] 
By disregarding these other allegations Admiral reveals that it "can't handle the 
truth." The disregarded allegations confirm that the underlying lawsuits are about 
advertising, not breach of warranty. Since claimants' "injury" (paying money to 
purchase Akavar) allegedly "arose out o f Basic Research's alleged "use of another's 
1 
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[Western Holdings'] advertising idea in [their] 'advertisement,'" inducing those 
purchases, potential coverage is implicated and Admiral's defense duty triggered. 
Admiral's focus on an isolated allegation that the representative plaintiff tried 
Akavar but did not lose weight [AB 8-9] incorrectly implies no other facts meeting 
Benjamin's "one . . . allegation" requirement are pled. As previously noted [OB 6-10; 
Record on Appeal ("R") 803-805, 901, 1026-1027, 1032-1033, 1035-1036], the Miller, 
Tompkins and Forlenza complaints contain facts squarely meeting Benjamin's "one . . . 
allegation" requirement. 
Miller seeks certification of a plaintiff class consisting of "all persons or entities 
who or that purchased [Akavar] within the United States" (emphasis added), with no 
requirement that class members "used" Akavar. [R 827] "Entity" class membership 
requires only Akavar's purchase, not use, because "entities" cannot "use" Akavar [R 827] 
as they cannot swallow diet supplements and have no weight to lose. 
Nor does Admiral consider that the Tompkins' class representatives represent 
those "who purchased, not for sale or reassignment, [Akavar] [R 918-919]... [and] 
suffered injury as a result." [R 919] (emphasis added). Again, the consolidated 
Miller/Tompkins classes were certified with no "use" requirement: "Persons who 
purchased Akavar." Miller v. Basic Research, LLC, No. 2:07-CV-871 TS, 2011 WL 
818150 at *2 (D. Utah March 2, 2010). 
Admiral also disregards Forlenza's allegations that representative plaintiffs 
Forlenza, Monroe and "I. Bodor" "purchased" Akavar in reliance on the same 
advertisements alleged in Miller and Tompkins [R 1014-1015, 1017], and that "I. Bodor" 
2 
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seeks certification of a plaintiff class "who purchased [Akavar]" (emphasis added) 
excluding Miller and Tompkins class members. [R 1023-1024] Here too, there is no 
"use" requirement. 
B. Claimants Allege Class "Damages" Resulting Only from Akavar 
Purchases, Not from its Use 
The Miller, Tompkins and Forlenza allegations fall squarely within Admiral's 
obligation to pay "damages" because of "personal and advertising injury," defined as 
"injury . . . arising out o f an enumerated offense. [R 37, 47, 97] These elements are met 
[OB 18-21], triggering potential coverage and Admiral's defense duty. Cloud Nine, 464 
F.Supp.2d at 1166; Sharon Steel Corp, v. Aetna Cas, & Sur, Co,, 931 P.2d 127, 133 (Utah 
1997). Admiral has not and cannot meet its burden of "establishing] that" all of the 
underlying "claims fall outside the coverage of the policy . . . , " Simmons v. Farmers Ins, 
Group, 877 P.2d 1255, 1258, n.3 (Utah App. 1994). 
Contending the underlying complaints allege damages caused by Akavar's failure 
to perform as advertised, Admiral disregards that the complaints seek damages resulting 
from purchases in reliance on advertisements, not from product use and failure to 
perform. Nor can Admiral do so because the underlying complaints meet Benjamin's 
"one . . . allegation" test. Miller seeks damages for violations of Utah's Consumer Sales 
Practices Act, Utah Code Ann. §13-11-1 et seq. and similar out of state statutes, and for 
"negligent misrepresentation." [R 843-848, 850-851] "As a result of Defendants' . . . 
negligent statements . . . Plaintiffs and the members of the Class have been injured 
and have suffered loss of money and property, and they are entitled to recover 
3 
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damages[.]" [R 846, 850-851, 853] (emphasis added) 
Tompkins also alleges plaintiffs and class members' entitlement to "damages" 
under California's Consumer Legal Remedies Act ("CLRA") (Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1750 et 
seq.) which permits an award of "damages" in addition to the "restitution" remedy the 
claimants separately seek under Cal. Bus. & Profs. Code § 17200 et seq. [R 925] These 
allegations contradict Admiral's attempted conflation of covered "damages" and 
"restitution" remedies as described below in detail. See Section II.B.2. 
In Forlenza the plaintiffs Forlenza, Monroe and "I. Bodor" allege they 
"purchased" Akavar in reliance on the same advertisements alleged in Miller and 
Tompkins. [R 1014-1015, 1017] The Forlenza claimants seek both "individual damages" 
[R 1018] and damages on behalf of a plaintiff class of "all citizens of California only who 
purchased [Akavar]" but excluding Miller and Tompkins class members. [R 1023-1024] 
Like Miller and Tompkins, Forlenza does not require "product use" as a class 
membership requirement. Like Tompkins, Forlenza seeks CLRA "damages" for 
plaintiffs and the class in addition to a distinct "restitution" remedy for other claims. [R 
1029,1038] 
Only Ms. Forlenza, individually, alleges damages "because she purchased a 
product based on false advertising and because the product has not worked as 
advertised." [R 1014-1015] (emphasis added) But the latter allegation does not 
eliminate the former allegation as Ms. Forlenza seeks damages based, in part, on 
purchases inspired by allegedly misleading advertisements. 
4 
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This Court can conclude as Admiral urges only by disregarding the underlying 
allegations that refute Admiral's arguments. Doing so improperly permits Admiral to 
"cobble together the most favorable allegations from both parties and disregard the 
rest[.]" Align Tech., Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 673 F. Supp. 2d 957, 972 (N.D. Cal. 2009). 
C. The Trial Court, Misled by Admiral, Erroneously Presumed All 
Claimants used Akavar Products 
The trial court accepted Admiral's mischaracterizations without citing the 
underlying complaints' pertinent language. But the above-referenced allegations prove 
the trial court wrong, as its "no potential coverage" ruling was premised on the same 
disregard of facts that Admiral now urges. Benjamin and Cloud Nine prohibit such a 
blatant disregard of the facts. 
II. ADMIRAL MISCHARACTERIZES THE LEGAL DOCTRINES 
ESTABLISHING POTENTIAL COVERAGE UNDER ITS POLICY 
A, Admiral Asserts a "Causation" Requirement Based on the Policy 
Term "Arising Out Of," Which Does Not Require "Proximate 
Causation" 
Admiral claims it only provides coverage where "the insured committed one of the 
defined offenses which is asserted to be the cause of the insured's liability for damages." 
[AB 21, 39] Here, Admiral inaccurately paraphrases the Policy language. It contains no 
requirement of "proximate causation" between a covered "offense" and "damages." The 
word "liability" does not even appear in the coverage language. Instead, the Policy 
requires only that Admiral pay "damages because of 'personal and advertising injury,5" 
defined as: "injury . . . arising out of one or more of the following offenses . . . 
[including] f. The use of another's advertising idea in your 'advertisement.'" [R 47] 
5 
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(emphasis added). 
Under Utah law, "arising out o f does not require direct proximate causation. Its 
meaning is broader, including: "originating from," "growing out of," "flowing from," 
"incident to" or "connected with." Durbano v. American Empire Ins., No. 91-4225, 91-
4142, 1992 WL 112246 at *2 (10th Cir. (Utah) 1992) (unpublished), citing Nat'I Farmers 
Union Prop. & Cas. Co. v. Western Cas. & Sur. Co., 577 P.2d 961, 963 (Utah 1978) 
(cited by Admiral). The Policy does not require a heightened causal link between the 
offense (f) and "damages." Instead, "injury" (claimants' payment of money) need only 
"arise out o f offense (f). 
Miller, Tompkins and Forlenza meet this requirement by alleging their plaintiffs' 
and class members' purchases "arose out o f (i.e., "originated from" or "flowed from") 
Basic Research's "advertisement," whose "advertising idea" originated with "another" 
(Western Holdings or others identified by the Federal Trade Commission). [OB 31-39] 
No other causal nexus need be alleged to trigger potential coverage. 
False advertising is injurious to potential consumers of a product that has been 
misrepresented whether or not the consumers actually use it. The mere purchase of 
Akavar, inspired by an "advertising idea" "used" in Basic Research's "advertisement," is 
a wasted expenditure constituting "injury," and supporting an award of damages. 
6 
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B. "Damages" Is a Remedy "Because of'Advertising Injury'" 
1. The Theory of Recovery Does Not Require Proximate Cause 
Analysis 
Bank of the West v. Sup. Ct9 2 Cal.4th 1254 (1992) does not support Admiral's 
construction but clarifies why Basic Research's analysis rings true. The Court held at 
1264: 
[T]he policy . . . covers "damages" for "advertising injury" 
caused by "unfair competition." Read in this context, the 
term "unfair competition" can only refer to a civil wrong that 
can support an award of damages. 
Here, the operative offense is "use of another's advertising idea in your 
'advertisement,' " not "unfair competition." The underlying false advertising claims 
assert civil wrongs that support a damage award. Nothing more need be shown to 
establish why the "as damages because of 'advertising injury' " provision is satisfied. [R 
851,922,1014-1015] 
The underlying complaints all assert express claims for recovery of damages based 
on "false advertising." The focus is not on the theory of recovery but on the facts pled 
which meet the offense's elements. Butler v. Clarendon Am. Ins. Co., 494 F. Supp. 2d 
1112, 1132 (N.D. Cal. 2007) ("Coverage is triggered by the offense, not the injury or 
damage which a plaintiff suffers . . . [for] 'advertising injury liability.'"). 
2. The Damages Remedy Is Not Altered By Measurement as 
Money Paid, Nor is the Damage Amount So Limited 
Confronted with Miller's, Thompson's and Forlenza 's allegations of and prayers 
for "damages," Admiral wrongly characterizes the sole remedy sought as non-covered 
purchase price "restitution." [AB 42-43] Not so. The complaints seek "damages" and, 
7 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
separately, "restitution" as different remedies with entitlement to each triggered by 
Akavar purchases, not use. (Again, the entity class member purchasers cannot use 
Akavar.) [R 827, 919, 1014-1015, 1023-1024] The purchases allegedly were prompted 
by advertised claims that purportedly cannot be true for anybody - not by claims proved 
untrue on a purchaser-by-purchaser basis. Otherwise the classes would exclude 
purchasers who did not use Akavar and thus cannot know whether it works for them. 
Damages, no matter how measured, are a distinct remedy allowed by state "false 
advertising" statutes pled in the underlying suits. See, California Legal Remedies Act 
("CLRA"), Cal. Civ. Code § 1780(a) (remedies include "actual damages" not less than 
$1,000 in class actions and, separately, "restitution of property.") It matters not that 
"damages" can be calculated as sums the class members paid for Akavar. The character 
of a "damages" remedy is not altered by its calculation. Delarosa v. Boiron, Inc., 275 
F.R.D. 582, 592 (CD. Cal. 2011) (if damage sum is limited to amount spent to purchase 
falsely advertised product "the amount of restitution under the UCL and actual damages 
under the CLRA is the same.") Admiral neither argues nor proves otherwise. 
Regardless, CLRA damages need not equal restitution amounts. They may be as little as 
$1,000 for the entire class (Cal. Civ. Code § 1780(a)(1); Delarosa, 275 F.R.D. at 593) or, 
for seniors sustaining "substantial physical, emotional or economic damages," as much as 
an additional $5,000 apiece. Cal. Civ. Code § 1780(b). 
C. Noscitur a Sociis Does Not Limit the Meaning of "Use of Another's" 
Admiral's reliance on the noscitur a sociis doctrine as a reason to impose a strict 
proximate cause standard is likewise unpersuasive. The proximity of offense (f), "use of 
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another's advertising idea in your 'advertisement' " to other separate offenses such as (g), 
"infringement upon another's . . . slogan," in no way alters the meaning of "use of 
another's." Admiral does not argue otherwise but nonetheless tries to invoke the doctrine 
to argue that just as its "liability" to an insured sued for false arrest depends on 
allegations of proximate causation between damages and "false arrest," so too does 
Admiral's "liability" to Basic Research depend on allegations of proximate causation 
between damages and the "use of another's" offense. [AB 19-21] However, the separate 
offenses do not imply a specific strict proximate cause standard for all offenses. 
Additionally, while noscitur a sociis may assist in construing the meaning of an 
ambiguous insurance policy term with reference to other terms immediately surrounding 
it, ambiguity must be found. Heathman v. Giles, 374 P.2d 839, 840 (Utah 1962) (the rule 
"requires that the meaning of doubtful rules or phrases be determined and take their 
character from associated words or phrases"). Admiral neither argues that its "use of 
another's advertising idea in your 'advertisement' " offense is ambiguous nor suggests 
any alternative meaning based on the other "personal and advertising injury" offenses 
surrounding it. 
Applied Bolting Tech. Products v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 942 F. Supp. 1029, 
1033, n.6 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (applying Vermont law), cited by Admiral, also is not on point. 
There, the district court ruled the "misappropriation of advertising ideas" offense (not at 
issue here) was not triggered by a competitor's allegation that the insured had falsely 
advertised that its product complied with industry standards. "Advertising idea" was held 
not to include such industry standards. In dictum the Admiral-cited footnote contained a 
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throwaway reference to noscitur a sociis without discussion or direct application of the 
facts. 
Applied Bolting's narrow construction of "advertising idea" is also inconsistent 
with subsequent opinions applying Utah law. In Cloud Nine, supra, 464 F. Supp. 2d at 
1166, an "advertising idea" was held, pursuant to prior authority, to be an "idea for 
calling public attention to a product or business, especially by proclaiming desirable 
qualities so as to increase sales or patronage." Judge Campbell determined that false 
advertising allegations implicate coverage for deceptive trade practice claims under Utah 
Code Ann. §13-1 la-3. Id. at 1169 {citing Elcom Technologies, Inc. v. Hartford Ins. Co. 
of the Midwest, 991 F. Supp. 1294, 1298 (D. Utah 1997), reaching the same result in a 
false advertising case). 
D. The Policy Term "Of' Imposes No Claimant Ownership Limit on the 
"Advertising Idea" 
Admiral's arguments are all based on the "straw man" premise that the Policy 
contains a requirement of proximate causation between "damages" and an offense 
(whether "false arrest" or "infringement upon another's copyright"). For the reasons 
argued above and elsewhere [OB 18-21] Admiral's premise is inaccurate, because 
"[ajrising out o f does not require proximate causation. 
As stated in Amco Ins. Co. v. Lauren-Spencer, Inc., 500 F. Supp. 2d 721, 733 
(S.D. Ohio 2007): 
Both the Second Circuit Court of Appeals and the Third 
Circuit Court of Appeals have interpreted the "arising out o f 
language as requiring the advertising to materially contribute 
to the injury of creating consumer confusion. But the 
advertisement does not need to be the only cause of the injury 
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to trigger the duty to defend. . . . The phrase indicates a 
requirement of a causal relationship but not one of proximate 
cause. 
Contrary to Admiral's arguments, the Policy neither provides nor implicitly 
contemplates that claimants must be "offended" by the "use of another's advertising 
idea." The component elements of "offense (f)" are not defined in the Policy nor 
circumscribed by the limited, flawed construction that Admiral asserts (aside from the 
term "advertisement" whose satisfaction is not contested). Admiral's policy construction 
is based on the same "inherent in the policy" argument that the Ninth Circuit recently 
rejected, concluding: "[n]othing in the relevant provision or Kelley's policy as a whole 
required that the allegedly injurious 'course of advertising' be undertaken by Kelley 
itself." Tom Kelley Studios, Inc. v. State Farm Gen. Ins. Co,, No. 10-55931, 2011 WL 
6396441, at *1 (9th Cir. Dec. 21, 2011). 
Another state Supreme Court agrees. In McCormack Baron Mgmt. Servs., Inc. v. 
American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 989 S.W.2d 168,171-72, 173 (Mo. 1999) the Missouri 
Supreme Court held: 
The word "offense" cannot be read to limit coverage only to a 
Earticular "cause of action" or "claim." [It] simply does not ave this meaning in either common usage or legal usage. . . . 
Coverage could be limited to specific and formal causes of 
action. . . . Additional cases from other jurisdictions generally 
support a broad interpretation of the term "offenses" in 
policies like the one involved here. 
Here as in Kelley, 2011 WL 6396441, at *1: "[A]t most, the policy language on 
this point is ambiguous because it is 'susceptible to two or more reasonable 
constructions.'" 
11 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
E. Basic Research's Alleged "Use" of Western Holdings' "Advertising 
Ideas" Triggers a Policy "Offense" 
Admiral neither contests the Utah law definitions of "of another" that Basic 
Research posits nor explains why an alleged consumer harm is insufficient to trigger 
possible coverage. What is pled suffices to constitute a "use of advertising idea" that 
results in possible harm, as found in Cloud Nine, 464 F. Supp. at 1167, and General Cas 
Co. of Wis. v. Wozniak Travel Inc., 762 N.W.2d 572, 579 (Minn. 2009). 
Westfield Ins. Co. v. Robinson Outdoors, Inc., No. 10-151 (JRT/JJG), 2011 WL 
5593171 (D. Minn. Nov. 17, 2011), now on appeal, is inconsistent with the Ninth 
Circuit's Kelley approach noted supra. That district court failed to explain how a distinct 
corporate party to a license arrangement with the insured would not be "of another." 
This is especially problematic because the phrase "of another" can mean "a 
different one." "Of is defined as "7. used to indicate possession, connection or 
association." RANDOM HOUSE UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 1343 (2d ed. 1993). 
"Another" is defined as "5. a different one; someone different." Id. at 85. the word "of 
does not limit rights to an "ownership" harm but includes "association" or "connection." 
Misconstruing the "use of another's advertising idea in your 'advertisement'" 
offense by narrowly substituting the phrase "wrongful taking" in contravention of the 
majority interpretation of "advertising idea" (as well as that adopted by Judge Campbell 
in Cloud Nine), Robinson failed to perceive that "of another" can be a distinct entity 
whose very legal separateness required the license agreement to confirm its rights. 
12 
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Here, Western Holdings is owned by an entity separate from Basic Research, 
requiring an arms-length license agreement with Basic Research permitting its use of the 
trademarked slogans in its "advertisements." [R 670, 808] 
III. ADMIRAL'S COVERAGE CASES ARE READILY DISTINGUISHABLE 
A. Admiral Cites No Coverage Case Analyzing False Advertising Claims 
under Offense (f) 
Trailer Bridge, Inc. v. Illinois National Ins. Co., 657 F.3d 1135 (11th Cir. (Fla.) 
2011) and Rose Acre Farms, Inc. v. Columbia Cas. Co., 662 F.3d 765, 2011 WL 5313818 
(7th Cir. (Ind.) 2011) analyzed claims labeled "antitrust," not claims for "false 
advertising," triggering a defense under Policy offense (f) - "use of another's advertising 
idea in your 'advertisement.' " Their analysis of offense (f)'s scope is inconsistent with 
Utah law and not persuasive authority. Simmons v. Farmers Ins. Group, 877 P.2d 1255, 
1258 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) ("language limiting an insurer's duty to defend an insured 
must be clear, unambiguous and sufficiently conspicuous in order to give proper notice to 
the insured of the limits on the duty to defend.") Trailer Bridge's narrow definition of 
these terms contradicts both Utah and Florida law. Simmons, 877 P.2d at 1258, Pet. for 
Reh'g, Case No. 10-13913, 9/27/2011, p. 11. 
In Rose Acre the Seventh Circuit, sub silentio, presumed Rose Acre was 
advertising its compliance with United Egg Producers' ("UEP's") guidelines during 
CNA's policy period as a member of the UEP. But Rose Acre was not a UEP member at 
the time of the initial advertising within the pertinent policy period. The Seventh 
Circuit's understanding of the facts are contradicted by those revealed in the record. Pet. 
/orite/*g,CaseNo. 11:1599, ECF No. 40, 11/14/2011, p. 3. This Court can do better. 
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While these factual errors call into question the outcome in Rose Acre (Pet. For Reh'g, 
Case No. 11:1599, p. 3), the Court's findings distinguish that case from the present facts 
because Admiral cannot dispute that the involved slogans were "of another" and not from 
Basic Research's marketing director. 
In Trailer Bridge and Rose Acre the courts also ignored persuasive authority 
decided under Utah law: 
Certainly Edizone has alleged "use" of those advertising ideas 
in the Cloud Nine Defendants' advertisements. . . . Edizone 
alleges a claim under the Utah Truth in Advertising Act, 
which specifically requires allegations of deceptive trade 
practices occurring in advertising. "The purpose of [the Utah 
Truth in Advertising Act] is to prevent deceptive, misleading, 
and false advertising practices and forms in Utah." Utah 
Code Ann. § 13-11 a-1. Clearly, the crux of a cause of action 
for violation of the Utah Truth in Advertising Act is 
advertising. 
Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Cloud Nine, LLC, 464 F. Supp. 2d 1161, 1167, 1168 (D. Utah 
2006); Wozniak Travel, Inc., 762 N.W.2d at 580 (travel company's use of term "Hobbit" 
to describe its travel agency capitalized on good will surrounding Tolkien's literary 
works, so alleged false advertising using that phrase fell within policy); Ohio Cas. Ins. 
Co. v. Alters Med., Inc., No. 03-1037-CV-W-ODS, 2005 WL 2319820, at *4 (W.D. Mo. 
Sept. 22, 2005) (pharmaceutical company's use of "Lipitor" to describe its cholesterol-
reducing drug alleged to unfairly compete with legitimate producer of same, Pfizer, 
triggered false advertising coverage). 
B. An Offense (f) "Advertising Idea" is Not Limited to a Claimant's 
"Advertising Idea" 
Admiral's policy also does not require that the "advertising idea" originate with 
the underlying claimant, as federal appellate courts have found. American Simmental 
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Ass n v. Coregis Ins. Co., 282 F.3d 582, 588 (8th Cir. (Neb.) 2002) (challenged "full-
blood" cattle designation "advertising idea" did not originate with claimants); Native 
American Arts, Inc. v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 435 F.3d 729, 734 (7th Cir. (111.) 2006) 
("Indian-made" "advertising idea" did not originate with claimant). 
Construing the predecessor "misappropriation of advertising ideas" policy 
language, the Ninth Circuit could not "discern any contextual, public-policy, or logical 
significance to who owns the legal rights to the advertising idea in question." Hyundai 
Motor Am. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA, 600 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 
(Cal.) 2010). Here too, Admiral's "use" language lacks such "significance." The policy 
covers an insured's "advertising idea . . . use" and coverage is not limited to the insured's 
origination of an "idea." 
As this court recently reaffirmed in U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. United States Sports 
Spec. Assn., 2012 UT 3,1J14, P.2d , 2012 WL 192793, Utah courts will not 
rewrite insurance policies under the guise of policy construction. There is no basis to 
substitute more narrow policy language than that used by Admiral under the guise of 
interpretation. 
Trailer Bridge, 657F.3datll43 articulated and applied a "concept about the 
manner the product is promoted" as the definition for "advertising idea." In doing so the 
appellate court disregarded its prior broader definition ("any idea or concept related to the 
promotion of a product to the public"), without explanation. Hyman v. Nationwide Mut. 
Fire Ins. Co., 304 F.3d 1179, 1188 (11th Cir. (Fla.) 2002). Trailer Bridge thereby failed 
to follow its own precedent and disregarded fundamental Florida insurance coverage law 
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principles. Creative Hospitality Ventures, Inc. v. United States Liab. Ins. Co., 655 F. 
Supp. 2d 1316, 1329 (S.D. Fla. 2009) ("[An insurer] cannot ask the court to re-write the 
policy for [them] under the guise of policy construction."). This Court cannot reach 
Trailer Bridge's result without similarly disregarding stare decisis and ignoring Utah's 
identical prohibition on rewriting policies. Alfv. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 850 P.2d 
1272, 1275 (Utah 1993). 
Similarly, Rose Acre's analysis of the Policy term "of another" differs from Utah's 
approach. The conclusion that "animal husbandry" concerns were not alleged as a 
pretext for higher egg prices "in any of the 353 paragraphs of the antitrust complaint" is 
based on an overly restrictive reading of the underlying fact allegations and was contrary 
to the district court's factual findings: 
One of the ways that plaintiffs allege that Rose Acre . . . 
[was] able to conceal their anti-competitive activity was by 
falsely representing that the reduced egg supply and higher 
prices were "as a result of husbandry concerns.' 
Rose Acre Farms, Inc. v. Columbia Cas. Co., 772 F. Supp. 2d 994, 1001 (S.D. Ind. 2011) 
affd on narrower grounds, Rose Acre Farms, Inc. v. Columbia Cas. Co., 662 F. 3d 765 
(7th Cir. 2011). The court also failed to consider the Internet pages provided to the 
insurer which pre-dated Rose Acre's joining UEP and that the district court quoted in 
Rose Acre, 772 F. Supp. 2d at 1002, n.8: 
Eggs from the "free roaming" farms cost much more than 
regular eggs because the eggs must be gathered by hand from 
the indi victual hen's nest. 
Concerns with the factual approach of the appellate court, however, do not 
overcome the reality that the facts of this case differ. Here, the promotional campaign the 
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insured adopted cannot be treated as if created by Basic Research's own marketing 
director or retained advertising agency. 
Rose Acre fs error is also highlighted when considering other Policy provisions that 
exclude only some forms of "false advertising." Exclusion (g), which eliminates certain 
forms of "false advertising" for "failure to conform to representations of quality or 
performance," reveals that coverage for other forms of false advertising is contemplated. 
Were this not so, the exclusion from coverage for some types of advertising would be 
unnecessary. 
This logic is buttressed by elementary insurance business principles. Construing 
"of another" to mean "advertising ideas" that the insured did not originate poses a 
diminished actuarial risk. Insurers need not insure against newly-created advertising 
concepts whose originality may generate litigation disputes, as is true of those in the 
"advertising" business falling within exclusion (j)(l). 
Rose Acre also failed to consider or address: (1) the possibility that under Indiana 
law the term "of another" might be ambiguous in this context; or (2) how the policy 
"construed as a whole" unambiguously restricts "of another's" meaning to "of a 
claimant." Pet. for Reh g, Case No. 11:1599, p. 9. Rose Acre's analysis is therefore 
inconsistent with Utah law. Taylor v. American Fire & Cas. Co., 925 P.2d 1279, 1282 
(Utah Ct. App. 1996) ("An ambiguity may arise because the parties may attach two or 
more feasible meanings to a policy's term.. . . If policy language is ambiguous, the 
ambiguity is resolved against the insurer."). Rose Acre could only be correct if the policy 
language was: "misappropriation of the claimants' advertising idea in your 
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'advertisement' " and misappropriation were limited to a "wrongful taking" other than 
"misuse." 
Here too, Admiral's Policy does not state "of a competitor" or "of another but not 
of a co-defendant," nor does it disqualify "ideas" of "another" who may be an alleged co-
conspirator. The Policy term is "of another's" - without the express limitation Admiral 
seeks to impose. To duplicate Rose Acre's error of rewriting Admiral's Policy in the 
guise of construction would be to disregard Utah law. Alf, 850 P.2d at 1275. 
Arguing for its preferred narrow meaning of "another," Admiral also asserts that 
Western Holdings, affiliated with Basic Research, cannot be deemed "another." But 
Admiral fails to dispute or refute that "another" can reasonably mean (and thus under 
Utah law must be deemed to include) numerous other prior users of the advertised 
phrases at issue, as identified by the Federal Trade Commission. [OB 34-35] Admiral 
"concedes [the] point by [its] failure to address it in [its] opposition brief." Misner v. 
Potter, 2:07-CV-330 TS, 2008 WL 410128, at *3 (D. Utah Feb. 12, 2008). 
C. "Advertising Ideas" are not Limited to Misappropriation 
Although Rose Acre presumed that the personal and advertising injury offense of 
"use of another's advertising idea in your 'advertisement'" is limited to a single readily-
definable tort, no such tort exists. "What is important is . . . whether that conduct as 
alleged in the complaint is at least arguably within one or more of the categories of 
wrongdoing that the policy covers." Curtis-Universal Inc. v. Sheboygan Emerg. Med. 
Servs., Inc., 43 F.3d 1119, 1122 (7th Cir. (Wis.) 1994). 
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Rose Acre also failed to acknowledge or appreciate the significance of the 
different meanings of "use" and "misappropriation." A wrongful "use" or misuse not 
"wrongful taking" is implicated. Application of a narrow tort label for the "use of 
another's" offense contravenes Indiana law and would contravene Utah law. Pet. for 
ite/fg, Case No. 11:1599, p. 5. 
Federal pleading rules lead to the same conclusion. DISH Network Corp. v. Arch 
Specialty Ins. Co., 659 F.3d 1010,1015-16 (10th Cir. (Colo.) 2011): 
Insurers have 'a heavy burden to overcome in avoiding the 
duty to defend, such that the insured need only show that the 
underlying claim may fall within policy coverage; the insurer 
must prove it cannot.' . . . This liberal approach recognizes 
the reality that 'notice pleading does not contemplate detail 
and specificity,' . . . and a complaint may initially 'lack detail 
necessary to conclusively establish the duty[.] 
D. Admiral's Other Cases Are Readily Distinguishable 
Other cases cited by Admiral add nothing of substance to the analysis. Clarcor, 
Inc. v. Columbia Cas. Co., No. 3:10-00336, 2010 WL 5211607 , at *12-13 (M.D. Tenn. 
Dec. 16, 2010) involved an extraordinarily narrow construction of "advertising idea" 
which Admiral argues if applied here would not trigger the "use of another's advertising 
idea in your 'advertisement'" offense. [Appellee's Brief, pp. 24-26] Admiral is mistaken 
because the law governing the insurance policy in dispute in Clarcor substantively differs 
from Utah law. 
Curiously, the Clarcor court cited no Tennessee decisional law (even though that 
law was held to govern the policy) but only Sorbee Int'l Ltd. v. Chubb Custom Ins. Co., 
735 A.2d 712, 714 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999). The Clarcor court narrowly construed 
"advertising idea" as:"[A]n idea for advertising that is 'novel and new,' and 'definite and 
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concrete,' such that it is capable of being identified as having been created by one party 
and stolen or appropriated from another." Clarcor, 2010 WL 5211607, at *12. The 
Clarcor court then found the coverage offense not triggered by the underlying competitor 
plaintiffs underlying allegations that the insured was advertising its competing goods 
with packaging designs, colors and a rating system similar to the claimant's on the 
grounds these things were not "novel." Id. 
Clarcor thereby improperly limited the offense to the narrowest tort that could fall 
within its ambit - common law misappropriation. See Riese v. QVC, Inc., No. CIV. A. 
97-40068, 1999 WL 178545, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 30, 1999) (common law 
misappropriation limited to marketing technique that is "novel," "new" and "concrete."). 
But "[T]ort law principles do not control judicial construction of insurance contracts . . . " 
Creative Hospitality Ventures, Inc. v. United States Liab. Ins. Co., 655 F.Supp. 2d 1316, 
1329 (S.D. Fla. 2009). 
Clarcor is unpersuasive because Tennessee and Pennsylvania law are inconsistent 
with Utah law, which does not narrowly construe terms not defined in an insurance 
policy. In Cloud Nine, 464 F.Supp. 2d at 1166 (applying Utah law) the District of Utah 
found that ordinary product trade names are "advertising ideas" because broadly 
construing the involved terms, the "plain and ordinary meaning of 'advertising idea' 
generally encompasses 'an idea for calling public attention to a product or business, 
especially by proclaiming desirable qualities so as to increase sales or patronage.'" Other 
courts have construed the term identically, American Simmental Ass 'n, 282 F.3d at 587 
(applying Montana law), or more broadly as "any idea or concept related to the 
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promotion of a product to the public." Hyman v. Nationwide Mut, Fire Ins, Co,, 304 F.3d 
1179, 1188 (11th Cir.(Fla.) 2002). Admiral suggests no reason why the terms in its 
policy should be construed narrowly as in Clarcor rather than as construed in Cloud Nine 
or Hyman. Basic Research's advertising slogans fall well within an "advertising idea." 
Welch Foods v, Natfl Union Fire Ins. Co., Civ. Action No. 09-12087-RWZ, 2010 
WL 3928704 (D. Mass. 2010), affd, Welch Foods v. National Union Fire Co, of 
Pittsburgh, 659 F.3d 191, 193 (1st Cir. (Mass.) 2011) is similarly inapposite. An 
insured's advertisements for its "pomegranate juice" were alleged by a competitor to be 
false because the juice actually was a blend of juices, not pure pomegranate juice. With 
Clarcor-like narrowness, Welch limited the meaning of "advertising idea" to "the manner 
in which one advertises its goods and does not include the content of such advertising," 
then found no potential coverage. Id, at *4. 
Welch's narrow definition of "advertising idea" was not based on applicable 
Massachusetts law but derived from a string-citation to Accessories Biz, Inc, v. Linda and 
Jay Keane, Inc, 533 F. Supp. 2d 381, 387 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), which asserted the definition 
adopted in J,A. Brundage Plumbing & Roto-Rooter, Inc, v. Massachusetts Bay Ins, Co,, 
818 F. Supp. 553 (W.D.N.Y. 1993), vacated by reason of settlement, 153 F.R.D. 36 
(W.D.N.Y. 1994). The Brundage definition clarified why certain trademark claims could 
fall within a proposed definition of the distinct term "misappropriation of advertising 
ideas" - an offense different from the "use of another's advertising idea" offense at issue 
here. But Brundage neither stated nor suggested that its "advertising idea" definition 
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was intended to apply to other offenses, nor to limit the scope of available definitions in 
other contexts like those presented in Miller, Tompkins and Forlenza. 
Clarcor, Welch and Accessories Biz each inaccurately and too-narrowly construed 
"advertising idea." But such construction is contrary to Utah's broad policy construction 
principles. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Assoc, v. Sandt, 854 P.2d 519, 521 (Utah 1993) 
("[IJnsurance policies should be construed liberally in favor of the insured . . . so as to 
promote and not defeat the purposes of insurance."). Applying this principle here, this 
Court should construe "advertising idea" with the breadth articulated in Cloud Nine, 
American Simmental and Hyman and, so applying the term, find potential coverage. 
IV. EXCLUSION (G) DOES NOT BAR A DEFENSE 
Admiral bears the burden of proving its Policy's Exclusion (g) - "'personal and 
advertising injury' arising out of the failure of goods . . . to conform with any statement 
of quality or performance made in your 'advertisement'" - "clearly" bars a defense. LDS 
Hosp., a Div. of Intermountain Health Care, Inc. v. Capitol Life Ins. Co., 765 P.2d 857, 
859 (Utah 1988). To do so, Admiral must overcome the "general presumption . . . to the 
effect that that which is not clearly excluded from the operation of [an insurance] contract 
is included[.]" Id. 
Admiral fails to meet its burden. Clarcor, supra, 2010 WL 5211607, at *13-14 
found the "failure to conform" exclusion applicable on distinguishable grounds. There, 
specific false advertising comparing the underlying claimant's and the insureds' 
competing products was alleged. The advertisements there at issue expressly focused the 
insured's product's "quality" and "performance" - "Purolator's claim of "97% overall 
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filtration efficiency." Clarcor, 2010 WL 5211607, at *3. But as previously explained 
[OB 45-50], such facts are not alleged in Miller, Tompkins or Forlenza. 
Westfieldlns. Co. v. Robinson Outdoors, Inc., Civil No. 10-151 (JRT/JJG), 2011 
WL 5593171 (D. Minn. Nov. 17, 2011) (presently appealed to the Eighth Circuit) also 
analyzed the "failure to conform" exclusion in a manner inconsistent with Utah and 
Minnesota law, under which "[w]here multiple claims are present" Admiral can escape 
its duty to defend only by showing "that no single claim . . . arguably [falls] within the 
scope of coverage." AMCO Ins. Co. v. Inspired Technologies, Inc., 648 F.3d 875, 880 
(8th Cir. (Minn.) 2011) - an appellate decision that reversed District Judge Tunheim 
(who decided Robinson, 2011 WL 5593171, on which Admiral heavily relies) because 
extrinsic evidence disposing of some otherwise-covered claims based on the insured's 
intentional misconduct did not dispose of other claims in which negligent misconduct 
liability outside the policy's exclusion could be found. 
Robinson also incorrectly decided that an insured's licensed use of an "advertising 
idea" does not trigger potential coverage even though such allegations evidence the 
parties' mutually independent legal status, thereby vitiating the notion that the advertising 
idea is not "of another." 2011 WL 5593171, at *7. 
Admiral argues that the underlying claims' "essence" is that claimants "bought the 
product, took it as directed and didn't lose weight." [AB 44] But self-serving 
characterizations based on inaccurate paraphrasing cannot supplant the actual underlying 
allegations which, as Section I above establishes, support damages resulting from 
Akavar's purchase - not from its failure to perform. Since there are facts pled in at least 
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one claim in each underlying lawsuit that are beyond Exclusion (g)'s scope, the exclusion 
does not bar a defense to any of the lawsuits. Inspired Technologies, 648 F.3d at 883. 
Basic Research has established why Admiral cannot meet its burden. [OB 45-50] 
As shown in Section I, supra, the offense at issue ("use of another's advertising idea in 
your 'advertisement' ") is not alleged to "arise out o f any such "failure to conform" to 
any statement. Again, that is because the claimants allege a plaintiff class and its 
members' entitlement to damages because they "purchased" Akavar, not because they 
tried it and it did not work as advertised. 
Admiral's criticism of Basic Research for "parsing" dictionary definitions of 
words to ascertain the exclusion's meaning is baffling. Utah courts consult lay 
dictionaries to understand non-defined insurance policy terms as a reasonable lay insured 
would understand them. Cypress Plateau Min. Corp. v. Commonwealth Ins. Co., 972 F. 
Supp. 1379, 1384 (D. Utah 1997) ("Ordinarily, a dictionary is a valuable resource for 
[insurance policy] interpretation."); Rasmussen v. Western Cas. & Sur. Co., 393 P.2d 
333, 337 (Utah 1964). As Basic Research predicted, [OB 46-47] Admiral offers no 
different definitions of Exclusion (g)'s terms than the dictionary definitions Basic 
Research provides. 
Total CallIntl., Inc. v. Peerless Ins. Co., 181 Cal. App. 4th 161, 172 (Cal. App. 
2010) requires no different result. There, the insured's competitors alleged the insured's 
phone cards did not provide the number of call minutes advertised. Exclusion (g) applied 
because a covered offense (implied "disparagement" of competitors' phone cards) 
allegedly "arose out o f the phone cards' "failure to conform" to their advertised quality. 
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For the same reason the exclusion applied in the other cases cited in Admiral's lengthy 
Total Call quotation. [AB 34-35] 
But where (as here) the offense allegedly "arises out o f something other than the 
products' actual efficacy (e.g., the "goods" were purchased without regard to whether 
they worked as advertised), the exclusion is not triggered. Infor Global Solutions 
(Michigan), Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 686 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1007-08 (N.D. 
Cal. 2010) (exclusion inapplicable because lawsuit for implied defamation of competitor 
through negative comparison of insured's and competitor's products in insured's 
advertisements had nothing to do with whether the insured's own products possessed 
their advertised attributes). 
Nor do the cases cited in Total Call on which Admiral relies support its 
arguments. In Skylink Technologies, Inc. v. Assurance Co., 400 F.3d 982, 984 (7th Cir. 
(111.) 2005), the insured falsely advertised its garage door opener controls were 
compatible with a competitor claimant's garage door openers. The court found the 
infringement was not caused by advertising that created colorable liability but rather the 
manufacture, use and sale of the infringing product. Unlike here, the underlying claimant 
failed to mention any specific advertisements in its lawsuit. Given those underlying 
allegations the court held that merely posting a manual on a website and employee 
recommendations that customers obtain additional product information from it did not 
constitute advertising. 
In New Hampshire Ins. Co. v. Power-O-Peat, Inc., 907 F.2d 58, 58-59 (8th Cir. 
(Minn.) 1990), coverage was denied because a competitor's allegations that the insured 
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mislabeled its manure's contents triggered a policy exclusion for: "incorrect description 
or mistake in advertised price of good[s] . . . advertised" - an exclusion different from 
Admiral's "failure to conform" exclusion. In stark contrast, here claimants seek damages 
"arising out o f their advertisement of a product, not because the product did not conform 
to statements about it. 
Superperformance Int'l, Inc. v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 203 F. Supp. 2d 587, 589-
590 (E.D. Va. 2002) is equally unpersuasive. There, a competitor sued the insured 
manufacturer of sports cars and related products for infringing the "Shelby" and "Cobra" 
trademarks. A defense was denied primarily because the "first publication exclusion" 
(inapplicable here) barred a defense. It was also held that Exclusion (g) barred a defense 
to any "false advertising" claim. But that bare conclusion was unsupported by 
discussion, analysis or explanation. Superperformance is not applicable where, as here, a 
competitor is not suing and a mark is not at issue. 
Moreover, Admiral's interpretive theory broadly construes this exclusion in 
contravention of Utah law. An exclusion must bar a defense in all possible worlds. 
Jewelers Mut. Ins. v. Milne Jewelry Co., No. 2:06-CV-243 TS, 2006 WL 3716112, at *3 
(D. Utah Dec. 14, 2006) (unpublished) (Exclusion (g) ambiguous as applied to "Navajo 
Jewelry"); Elcom, 991 F. Supp. at 1298 (Exclusion (g) inapplicable where product not 
alleged to rise to level advertised in terms of "quality or performance."). 
V. CONCLUSION 
For all the above reasons Judge Dever's ruling should be reversed and Admiral 
found to owe a defense to Plaintiffs in the Miller, Tomkins and Forlenza actions. This 
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case should be remanded to quantify Basic Research's damages and prejudgment interest, 
and for entry of judgment requiring Admiral to defend Basic Research in the ongoing 
consolidated Miller/Tompkins case. 
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